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IN rrHE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICIIMOND. 
Record No. 1536 
E.PP A HUNTON, IV, EXECUTOR OF THE E.STATE OF 
EPP A HUNTON, JR .. , 
vs .. 
COl\[l\fON\.VEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of 
the Supre,me Court of Appeals of V·irginia: 
Your petitioner, Eppa Hunton, IV, Executor of the Estate 
of liJppa Hunton, Jr., respectfully represents that on the 
11th clay of August, 1932, he filed his petition in the Hust-
iug·s Court of the ·City of Richmond, Virginia, for redress 
ag·ainst alleged erroneous assessments of State in-come taxes 
1uacle against Eppa Hunton, Jr., your petitioner's decedent, 
during his lifethne "7herehy the Estate of Eppa I-Iunton, ,Jr., 
is charged ''rith State income taxes in the an1ount of $572.58 
for the tax assessment y-ear 1928, $682.59 for the tax assess-
nlent year 1929 and $735.81 for the tax assessn1ent year 1H30, 
which said assessments were upon income received by your 
petitioner's decedent during· each of the calendar years pre-
ceding the tax assessment year for which the tax was as~ 
sessed. (Tr., p 9.) Whereupon such proceedings were had 
therein that on the 31st day of J a.nuary, 1934,. final judgment 
was rendered in said cause against your petitioner .{Tr., p. 
ll), and a transcript of the record of the proceedings in said 
suit and of the judgment there_in is herewith exhibited. 
Your petitioner is advised and represents to this honorable 
Court that the said judgment is erroneotlS and that he is ag-
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ASSIGNlVIENT.S OF ERRORS. 
1. The Court erred in holding that your petitioner's dece-
dent was properly assessed with income taxes for the tax 
assessment year 1928 in the amount of $572.58, for the tax 
assessment year 1929 in the amount of $682.59, and for the 
tax assessment year 1930 in the amount of $735.81, all of which 
said assessments were on incorne received by your petitioner's 
decedent in the year previous to the tax assessment year for 
which assessed, which income was derived from dividends 
received from railroad and other public service corporations 
of which your petitioner's decedent was a stockholder. 
2. The Court erred in holding that the assessment made on 
December 29, 1931, for the tax assessment year of 1928 in the 
amount of $572.58 on income received during the calendar 
year 1927 and that the assessment made on July 19, 1932, of 
$682.59 for the tax assessment year 1929 on income received 
during the calendar year 1928 was :riot barred by the limita-
tion imposed on such assessn1ents by section 418 of the Tax 
Code. 
STATE~IENT OF, THE CASE. 
The petitioner's decedent did not report as taxable income 
for the calendar year 1927, dividends received during said 
year 1927 upon shares of stock owned by him in railroad com-
panies. and other public service corporations which paid an 
annual franchise tax in the State of Virginia, said franchise 
tax upon railroad companies being· provided for in Section 177 
of the Constitution of Virginia, and Section 28 of Chapter 
576 of the Acts of 1926, now Section 216 of the Tax Code of 
Virginia, said franchise tax on other public service corpora-
tions being assessed under the pr.ovisions of Section 36Y2 of 
Chapter 576 of the Acts of A.ssembly of 1926, no'v Section 229 
of the Tax Code of Virginia. 
The petitioner's decedent did not report as taxable for the 
years 1928 and 1929 diYidends received from the sl1arP.s of 
stock owned by him in railroad companies or .dividends re-
ceived hy him from shares of stock owned by him in water, 
heat, ligl)t and power companies, which paid an annual fran-
chise tax for said years 1928 and 1929. 
lTnder date of December 29, 1931, the Department of Taxa-
tion undertook to levy-an assessment against petitioner's de-
cedent upon such dividends so received during the calendar 
year 1927. Under date of July 19, 1932, the Department of 
Taxation undertook to make an assessment of income tax 
on such dividends received during the calendar year 1928, · 
and under date or July 19, 1932, said Department of Taxa-
------- --~~-·------
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tion undertook to make an assessment of income tax on clivi-· 
dends received during· the calendar year 1929. 
For the years 1927, 1928 and 1929 the railroad companies 
and other public service corporations, dividends upon whose 
shares held by petitioner's decedent in said years were as-
sessed as hereinabove stated, paid franchise taxes imposed 
upon each of thern for the years 1926, 1927, 1928 and 1929. 
CONTENTION OF PETITIONER. 
First: Petitioner contends that, under the provisions of 
Section 177 of the Constitution of Virginia and Section 28 
of Chapter 576 of the Ac.ts of Assembly of 1926, now Sec-
tion 216 of the Tax Code of Virginia, providing for the as-
sessinent of franchise tax upon railroad companies, and Sec-
tion 170· of the Constitution and Section 36¥2 of Chapter 576 
of the Aets of Assembly of 1926, no''T Section 229 of the Tax 
Code, under 'vhich franchise tax has been levied upon rail-
roads and other public service corporations, in. whcb it is 
provided that the said franchise tax 
''shall be in lieu of all taxes or license charges whatsoever 
upon the franchise of such corporation, the shares of stock is-
sued by it and upon all its property * * * '' . 
the in-come deriv-ed from said shares can not be taxed be-
cause a tax levied on the income is a tax on the shares, and 
that a tax on income is a tax on the property or source from 
which the income is derived, if the source be not subject to 
tax the income cannot be. · 
Second: That, as to the assessment solight to be made by 
the Department of Taxation December 2-9, 1932, upon income 
received during the year 1927, and as to the assessment 
soug-ht to be made by the Department of Taxation July 19, 
1.9~2, upon the dividend or income received during the year 
] 92R, the Department of Taxation is without authority to make 
the same as Section 418 of the Tax ·Code under which the as-
sessments were sought to be made provides for an a~sess­
lnent of omitted taxes ''for any tax year of the three tax 
years last past" and not for four years. That the tax l~vied 
December 29, 1931, was upon income received in 1927, and 
tl1at the levy sought to ·be m~de in July, 1932, was upon in-
come received in 1928, in each case was for periods beyond 
the three tax years last past. 
In other words, .the Department of Taxation, without au-
- thority,, has undertaken to assess alleged taxable income be-
yond the ''three tax years last past''. 
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ARGU:NIENT. 
I. 
The first contention of the petitioner may be briefly stated 
to be that a tax on the interest or income of property is a 
.tax upon the property itself and that if the property is exempt 
from taxation the income received therefrom cannot be 
taxed. 
The first question to be considered is 
Are shares of stock of the railroad companies and the pub-
lic service corporations here involved exempt from taxes un-
der the laws of the State of Virginia? 
Railroa·d Shares. · 
As to railroad corporations, Section 177 of the Constitution 
of Virg·inia provides in part as follows: 
·''Every such railway or canal corporation shall also pay an 
annual State franchise tax to be prescribed by la.w, upon the 
gross receipts hereinafter specified in section one l1nnclred 
and seventy-eight, for the prhrilege of exercising its fran-
chises in this State, wbjch, 'vith the taxes provided for in 
section one hundred and seventy-six, shall be in lieu of all 
other taxes, or license cha1·ges whatsoever upon the fi~an­
chise of such corporation, the shares of stock issued by it, 
or upon its property assessed under section one hundred and 
seventy-six, etc. • ~ * " 
The General Assembly of Virginia has imposed this tax 
pursuant to the authority of the Constitution as will appear 
from Section 28 of Chapter 576 of the Acts of 1926, now a 
part of Section 216 of the Tax Code, and in providing for 
such tax repeats the exemption provided for in the Constitu-
tion in the following language: 
'' * • * which, with the taxes hereinbefore provided for 
shall be in lie·u of all taxes or license chat·,qes whatso<?ver upon 
the franchises of such corporations and shares of stnclc issued 
by them and upon all their property as hereinbefore pro-
vided.'' 
--- --- --~-- ---
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Shares of Othe1· P~tblic Serv-ice Corporations. 
'l~he General Assembly of Virg·inia has sought to enlarge th~ 
scope of the gross receipts tax and has, by .Section 3() Y2 of 
Chapter 576 of the Acts of 1926, now Section 229 of the 'I,ax 
Code, provided for the payment of annual Stab~ franchise 
tu . .x. equal to ~a per cent. on gross reeeipts and, after providiT,g 
for 8uch tax, expres.sly. declares in the language oi the Con-
stitution above referred to as follows: 
'' * * * which, ·with the taxes hereinbefore provided for 
shall be in lieu of all State taxes o·r license char.r;e.; whatso-
ever upon the franchise of such corporation and -~harr;s of 
stock issued by it, and upon all of its property as hereinbef(tru 
provided.'' 
The language of the Constitution and of the Acts of the 
General Assembly adopted pursuant to constitutional au-
thority could not be more en1phatic or comprehensive in pro-
viding for the exemption ."of shares of stock" of the corpora-
tion paying such franchise or gross receipt tax. That the 
full meaning and effect of the comprehensive language used 
in the ·Constitution l ~all other taxes or license charges what-
soever upon the franchise of the corporation, the shares of 
stock issued by it, or upon its property" was understood by 
the makers of the Constitution is borne out by other provisions 
in the very section of the Constitution and by s~1bsequent Acts 
of the General Assmnbly. For the makers of the Constitution 
deemed it necessary to add a provision to S'ection 177 so as 
to authorize other forn1s of taxation. in the following, which 
follows the declaration of exmnption in this section: 
'' * :!!< * provides that nothing herein contained shall exempt 
such corporations fro1n the annual fee required by Section 157 
of this Constitution or from assessments for street and other 
pi.1blic local improvements authorized by Section 170, and 
lJrovided further, that nothing herein contained shall annul 
or interfere with or prevent any contract or agreement by or-
dinance between street raih,ray corporations and n1unici11ali-
ties as to compmisation for the use of streets or alleys of 
·such municipalities by such railw·ay corporations.'' 
N otwithsta.nding the express provisions in Section 157 for 
the payment of tl1e fees therein provided in view of the con1-
prehensive exen1ption provided in tl1e first part of Section 177, 
the makers of the Constitution deemed it necessarv to declare 
·that the exemption provided for should not prevent the ·as-
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sessment of the fees or charges in Section 157, and so also with 
respect to the assess1nent of streets. The makers of the Con-
stitution found it necessary to n1ake a further exception in 
favor of the assessments usually provided for upon the g:ross 
earnings of street railway corporations by municipalities. 
These provisions following· the exmnption indicate that the 
taxes so authorized, notwithstanding the exemption, were 
those, and only those, which could be levied .. This is a neces-
sary conclusion and in accord with the canon of construction 
in incl·usio unius exclusio alterius. 
That the makers of the Constitution understood that a sub-
sequent imposition of a franchise tax upon other corporations 
than railroads was to be in lieu of the income tax will appear 
fron1 a consideration of Section 170 under which the Gen-
eral Assembly derives its authority to impose an income tax. 
The first sentence of this Section 170 entitled in part "In-
come, TJicenses and State Franchises'' is as follows: 
''The General Assembly n1ay levy a tax on incomes in ex-
cess of $600 per annun1; may levy a license tax upon any 
business which cannot be reached by the ad valorem system 
and may impose State franchise taxes, and in imposing a fran-
chise tax may, in its discretion, make th~ same in lieu of taxes 
upon other property in whole or in part of a transportation 
of commercial corporation.'' 
Tn this provision we find the authority to levy the income 
tax and the power to impose a franchise tax and n1ake it in 
lien of all taxes, included in the same sentence. This is equiva-
lent to saying· that the General Assembly may levy a tax on 
incomes and may also impose a franchise tax, but if it does 
the latter this must be in lieu of all the taxes preceding· 
It should be noted that the franchise tax levied on railroad 
And public service corporations is of an unusual nature. The 
tax on other corporations is levied on their net incomes while 
the tax on railroads and other public servi-ce corporations is a 
franchise tax based on their gross receipts. In the case of 
the ordinary businesR corporation, there is no tax imposed 
on its income unless it earns a. pro·fit, but in the case of rail-
roads and other public service corporations taxes are levied 
on their gross receipts and the State d~rives an income there-
from regardless of whether or not the corporation is in fact 
earning- a profit or sustaining a large loss. The effect of this 
unusual kind of tax is en1pl1asized particularly in these times, 
when as a matter of common knowledge, it is known that the 
railroads generally _are losing money; nevertheless the State 
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continues to derive its revenues in iarge part from these com-
panies which are constantly losing money. ·. 
It should also ·be borne in mind that the constitutional and 
8tatutory provisions for the exemption of the shares of stock 
issued by railroads and public service corporations from all 
other taxes, by reason of the imposition of t~e franchise tax, 
is but a hollow mockery unless the constitutional and statu-
tory provisions are given the construction contended for by 
the petitioner, because there are no taxes of any kind what-
soever imposed on shares of stock under the tax laws of Vir-
ginia. 
Constntction by the General Assentbly. 
The General Assembly in imposing the income tax has recog-
nized that corporations whose property is exempt from tax 
cannot be required to pay an income tax. Section 52 of the 
Tax Code, which is entitled "What corporations are liable 
and what are not liable to the income tax'', is in part as fol-
lows: 
'' .E1very domestic co1·poration organized under the laws of 
this State, and every foreign corporation doing business in 
this State (except public service corporations which are sub-
ject to a franchise tax or license tax upon gross receipts) 
"" * * " 
This exemption of public service. corporations (railroads 
included, of course) is an express recognition of the exemp-
tion provided for in Section 177. Section 177 :does not in 
express terms say that the income of the corporations paying 
the State franchise tax shall not be assessed, but it does ex-
pressly declare that this gross receipts tax shall be in lien of 
all taxes or license charges whatsoever "upon its property" 
assessed under Section 176. The exemption in the language 
of the Constitution is of the corporation's property. Legis-
lative recognition that where property is ·exempt the income 
clerived from the property is likewise exempt, appears from 
a consideration of other exemptions provided for in this same 
Section 52. . · 
Section 183 of the Constitution provides: 
"lJnless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the fol-
lowing property, and no other, shall be exempt from taxa-
tion, State and local, including inheritance taxes.'' 
.----
8 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
There then follow certain classes of property and corpora-
tions .. Many of the corporations named hold property yield-
ing income which, but for the exen1ption, should necessarily be 
otherwise- tax-ed. Pursuant to this constitutional exemption 
of the property, the General Assembly provided in S'ectiou 
52 for e~emption from income tax the revenue derived from 
the property of the classes referred to in Section 183 of the 
Constitution. If the property of these corpo:tntions wore not 
made exempt by the Constitution, and the exemption so made 
extends to the income, it is not within the power of the General 
Assembly to make exen1ptions in view of provisions of Section 
183 prohibiting exen1ptions except as stated therein. 
There is no escape from the conclusion under the provisions 
of the Constitution, and the A.cts of the General Assembly, 
to which we hav-e referred, that shares of stock here involved. 
are exempt from all other taxe~ or license charges whatso-
ever, save as expressly provided for. We submit that it is a 
necessary conclusion fr01n the review which we have 
made of the Acts of the General Assembly that the 
General Assembly had recognized that the exemption of 
the property of the corporations n1entioned carries with it 
an exemption of a tax upon the incon1e derived from such prop-
erty. And there can be no differentiation in the language of 
the Constitution or statutory exCinption when referring to 
shares of stock and when referring to property of the eor-
poration. 
TI-IE AUTIIORJTIES. 
If there have been Acts of the General Assembly which 
have seemed to exercise an authority to impose an income tax 
.derived from property which is exentpt, or if the Department 
of Taxation has at times, or fron1 tin1e to thne, interpreted 
the law so as to impose a tax upon the income derived from 
property which under the Constitution of the Staie is ex-
.empt, such action was in violation of the Constitution of Vir-
ginia, and in conflict with the uniform decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, and of the Statcf.;, wl1ich 
.-hold that the revenue or income derived from property can-
not be taxed under the guise of an income tax, a franchise, 
or an excise tax, if the source of the revenue or income is ex-
empt from taxation. 
In the well ]{nown case of Pollock vs. Fanners Loan & Tnt.st 
Co., 157 U. S. 429, the Supreme Court had under considera-
tion the income tax law prior to the adoption of the 16th 
amendment to the Federal Constitution. In that case the 
Court held that a tax on the income fr01n real estate was, 
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in effect, a. tax on the real estate itself and tl1at a tax on real 
estate levied by the 1Jnited St~tes was unconstitutional as be-
ing a direct tax. In its opinion the Court at page 583 said: 
"We are of the opinion that the law in the question, so 
far as it levies a tax on rents or on income from real estate, 
is in violation of the constitution and is invalid.'' 
Another question decided in the Pollock Case was as to 
'vhether or not the United States could levy an income t.a.x on 
]ncome received from state, county or municip·al securities. 
In discussing this question and holding that income fron1 such 
securities ~ould not be taxed by the United States, the Court 
at page 585 said the following· and quoted with approval from 
the opinion of Chief Justice :Wiarshall in Weston vs. Charles-
ton, 2 Pet. 449, 468; 
"It is contended that although the property or revenues 
of· the States or their instrumenta.lities cannot be taxed. nev-
ertheless the incon1e derived from state, county, and n1nnici-
pal securities can be taxed. B·ut we think the same want nf 
power to tax tl1e property or revenues of the States or their 
instrumentalities exists in relation to a tax on the inconw 
from their securities, and for the same reason, nnd that rea-
son is g·iven by Chief Justice rvfarshall in 1Ve.~ton YF\. Charles-
ton, 2 Pet. 449, 468, where he said 'The right to tax H1e ~on­
tract to any extent, when made, must operate upon the power 
to borrow before it is exercised, and have a scnsibh~ influ(~nce 
on the contract. The extent of this influcneo, (lepends on 
the will of a distinct government. To any extent, howcvei· 
inc.onsiderable, it is a burthen on the operations of ~ovorn­
ment. It may be carried to ·an extent which shall arrest them 
entirely. >l1< * ~ The tax on government stock is thought by 
this court to be a tax on the -contract, a tax on the power to 
borrow n1oncy on the credit of the ·united Sta1 es, t111d co11Sf'-
quently to be repu!,Yllant to the Constitution'. Applying· this 
language to these municipal securities, it is obvious that taxa-
tion on the interest tl1erefron1 w·ould operate on the power to 
borrow before it is exercised, and would have a sensible in-
fluence on the contract, and that the tax in question is a tax 
on the power of tbe States and their instrumentalities to 
borrow money, and consequently repugnant to tl1e Constitu-
tion.'' 
In n;e case of H' eston '""s. Cha·rlesto-n the court held invalid 
a tax on tl1e income from United States securities hnposed Ly 
the City of Charleston. 
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In the earlier case of Bt·o'wn vs. J.l1.aryland, 12 Wheat 419, 
the court had under consideration a license tax imposed by the 
State of ~iaryland on an importer. There again the Su-
preme Court held that such a license tax was a tax on the im-
ports themselves and was void under the Federal Constitu-
tion. Thus on page 444 it is said: 
''So a tax on the occupation of an importer is in like man-
ner a tax on importation. It must add to the price of the article 
and be paid by the consumer or by the importer himself in 
like manner as a direct duty on the article itself would be 
1nade. This the State has not a right to do because it is 
prohibited by the Constitution.'' 
And again at page 448 : 
''The distinction· between a tax on the thing imported and 
on the person of the importer can have no influence on this 
part of the subject. It is too obvious for controversy that 
they interfere equally with the power to regulate comn1erce. '' 
In Phila. 8. 8. Co. vs. Pennsylvania., 122 U.S. 326, the Court 
considered the validity of a tax hnposed by the State of Penn-
sylvania upon the gross receipts of a steamship eompany de-
rived from transportation of persons and pt·opcrty between 
different States and to and from f(>reigu countries. .A.t page 
336 of the op~nion the C'ourt said: 
''If, then, the commerce carried on .by the plaintiff in error 
in this case could not be constitutionally taxed by the state, 
could the fares and freig·hts 1·eceived for transportation in 
carrying· on that comnwrce be constitutionally taxed? If the 
state cannot tax the transportation, may it, nevertheless, tax 
the fares and freig·hts received therefor? Where is the dif"" 
ference 1 Looking at the substance of things, and not at mere 
fo1111S, it is very difficult to see any diffence. The one thing 
~cems to be tantamount to the other. It would seem to be 
rather metaphysics than plain logic for the state officials t.o 
say to the company: 'We will not tax you for the trans.:. 
portation you perform, hut we will tax you for what you get 
for perforn1ing· it.' S"ucb a position can l1ardly be said to be 
l1ased on a sound method of reasoning·.'' 
Paraphrasing the lang11age used in the Phila. 8 .. 8. Co. 
Ca;se, sztpra, we n1ight well inquire: 
"If the state cannot ta.x the stocl{, may it, nevertheless;. 
' 
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tax the dividends received therefrom 1 Where is the differ-
ence 1 Looking at the substance of things and not at mere 
forms, it is very difficult to see any difference. The one thing 
seems to be tantamount to the other.'' 
The policy of this State to develop railroads and other pub-
lic utilities is too well known. to require any proof nnd it is 
believed that this Court will take judicial notice of that policy 
which has extended over a long period of years, a~ we evi-
denced by its subscription to the stock of many public Hervice 
corporations, including the Richmond, lt"redericksburg· und 
Potomac Railroad Company which stock is still owned by and 
continues to be a source of considerable revenue to the Com-
monwealth, and that of the old J a.mes River and l{anawha 
Canal Company. 
Bearing· in mind this policy of fostering the development 
of railroads and other public utilities, can it be said that un-
der the Constitution it was intended that the stock of such 
public utilities and railroads should be exempt from taxation 
hut that the dividends from such stock could be subject to 
an unlimited income tax¥ No one would invest in securities 
bnt for the hope of a return in the form of earnings or of capi-
tal appreciation; and, while the State did not attempt to guar-
antee the earnings of such corporations, yet it did at thP. 
same time, by stating in its Constitution that the shares of 
stock of corporations paying a franchise tax on their gross 
receipts should be exempt from taxation, say to investors in 
this class of securities that whatever earnings su~h a cor-
poration 1night have would be p·rotected to its investors to this 
extent. 
If inco1ne or revenue from property may be taxed though 
the source of the income or revenue be declared to be exempt, 
such exemption is meaningless, for the property exempt has 
value only in view of income or revenue which may be de-
rived therefrom, and if the latter may be taxed nnd appro-
r•riated the property itself is taken. This is the reason for 
the law or rule for which we contend. This is th(~ founda-
tion of the general rule referred to in the opinion of the Court 
in the· Pollock Case, page 580 as follows: 
'' ~ «< • the general rule has always been, in th(} language of 
Coke, that 'if a man seized of land in fee by his deed granteth 
to another the profits of those lands, to have and to hold to 
him and his heirs, and maketh livery sec1.tnd u1n jo1·mam. 
r.hartae, the whole land itself doth pass. For whnt is the land 
hnt the profits thereof'' Co. Lit. 45. And that a devise of 
the rents and· profits or of the income of lands p9.sses the land 
12 .Supreme Court of. Appeals of Virginia. 
itself both at law and in equity, 1 ,Tarm. on "\Vilis· (5th Ed.); 
798. '' 
The· principle which we invoke is so well establish~tl and 
universally recognized that we hesitate to extend this memo-
randtim with citations of further authorities, but for the con-
VeJ)ience of the Court, we refer to the more important de-
cisions of the Supreme Court 'vith extracts from the opin-
ions. 
In Oille.r;;pie V!"'.. OklahO'ma, 257 U. S. 501., the issue was 
raised as to the right to tax net income derived by a lessee 
fr01n sales of his share of oil and gas received under leases 
of Indian lands. The Court held that the leases were an 
instrumentality used by the Government in fulfilling its duty 
to the Indians, and that the tax sought to be imposed by the 
statute of Oklahoma could not be in1posed upon the income or 
profits fron1 such leases. The Court based its opinion upon 
· · the view previously expressed by the Suprmne Court that in-
come from property which is itself immune from taxation 
could not be made the subject of tax. J\1r. Justice Holmes, 
d"!lring the opinion of the Court, said ( p. 505) : · 
"In cases where the principal is absolutely immnne fron1 
interference an inquiry is allow·ed into the sources from which 
net income is derived and if a part of it comes from such a 
source the tax is pro fa·nto void~ Pollock vs. Fanners' Loan 
~ Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601; a n1le lately illiis-
trated by Evans vs. Gore, 253 U. S. 245; and applied in a case 
somewhat like the present by the Supreme Court of Hawaii. 
Oahu Ry. ct Lantl Co. vs. Pratt, 14· Hawaii 126. Whether this 
property could be taxed in any other form or not, it cannot 
be reached as profits or income from leases such as those he-
fore us. The same considerations that invalidate a tax upon 
the leases invalidate .a tax upon the profits of the IeaseH, and7 
stopping short of theoretical' possibilities, a tax upon ~uch 
profits is a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States 
to make the best terms that it can for its wards." 
The theory that the income from tax exempt securities c.ari 
not be taxed 'vas taken one step further in the case of Miller 
vs. Milwa.'ltkee, 272 tT. 8. 713. In that case it appears that a 
corppration paid a tax upon its income, except such income 
as was received from lTnited States bonds. There was a pro-
vision in the laws of Wisconsin that the stocl{holders of a cor-
poration should not be taxed upon dividends received from 
corporations the income of which was assessed, but that, if 
only a part of the incon1e o.f the corporation was assessed, then 
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only a corresponding part of the dividends or income re-
ceived therefrom should be d,~ducted from the income taxed 
to the stockholders. 
The corporation in question was a holder of United States 
bonds. An attempt was made by the State of Wisconsin to 
tax the dividends received .by a stockholder of the corporation 
as to that proportion of the dividends which were paid out 
of income derived from interest on the United States bonds. 
The Court. held in that case that the State could not do in-
directly that which it could not do directly, and that the in-
coine tax on the individual stockhglder as to that ,proportion 
of dividends of the corporation paid fro1n interest on United 
States bonds owned by the corporation could not be taxed 
to him. 
In Northwestern llf.ulual Life Ins .. Co. vs. lVisconsin, 275 U. 
S. 137, a 3% tax was imposed by the State of Wisconsin on 
the gross income of all domestic insurance companies. The 
Northwestern Company reported in its receipts interest on 
United States bonds held by the Con1pany, but claimed that. 
snch interest was exempt fron1 the gross income tax. The tax 
was known as ''An An1'ual License F'ee' '. The Supreme 
Court, in the opinion by .lVIr. ;rustice 1\icReynolds, held that 
this tax was unconstitutional, saying: 
''Here the statute undertook to impose a charge of 3% 
upon every dollars of interest received by the Company from 
lJnited States bonds. So much in any event the State took 
from these fee receipts. This amounts, we think, to an imposi-
tion upon the bonds themselves and goes beyond the power of 
the S'tate." 
Again, in National Life Insurance Cotnpany vs. Uniter! 
States, 2i7 U. S. 508, Congress imposed a tax on the net. in-
come of life insurance companies after allowing· certain de-
ductions, including a deduction of incon1e received fron1 tax 
exempt securities. The Company contended that, in calculat-
ing the tax, the Collector had, in fact, included the incon1e 
received from the tax exempt securities and attempted to 
exact payment on a.ccount thereof. In the language of the 
Court, "He required petitioner to pay n1ore upon its taxable 
1ncome than could have heen de1nanded had this been derived 
solely from taxable securities". The Court, in its opinion 
holding such a construction of the law unconstitutional, said: 
"No device or form of words can deprive him of the ex-
emption for which he has lawfully contracted.'' 
The Court thereupon reversed the judgment of the Court 
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of Claims. "lbile dissenting· from the opinion expressed by 
the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in an opin-
ion concurred in by 1\fr. Justice Ifolmes and Mr. Justice Stone, 
recog·nized the principle contended for, saying: 
''Directed to tax the gross income from securities amounts, 
of course, to taxing the securities themselves.'' 
In MacAllen and Co. vs. lJ!Iassachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, there 
was in1posed by the· State of l\fassachusetts an exeise tax of 
2%% on its "net income!'. The taxing authorities of the 
State assessed against the appellant a tax based on the 
anwuut including all interest received from United States 
and other tax exempt bonds. The ~Iassachusetts court held 
that the tax in question was not an income tax but an excise · 
9n the privilege of doing· business. The Court, in its opinion 
reversing the l\1:assachusetts Supreme Court, said: 
''In the consideration of such legislation, the controlling 
principle constantly to be borne in mind is that the State can 
not tax the instrumentalities or bonds of the United States 
or, ~vhat is the same thing, the income derived therefrom, di-
rectly or indirectly. That is to say-it can not tax them in 
any form. Words which literally considered impose a tax 
upon something else-a tax for example as here for the privi-
lege of doing business, measured in part by the amount of 
non-taxable interest received-may nevertheless be adjudged 
to lay a tax upon the interest, if that purpose- be fairly infer-. 
able from a consideration of the history of the surrounding 
circumstances or the statute itself considered in all parts.'' 
And ag·ain the Court said that courts 
"should be acute to distinguish between an exaction which in 
substance and reality it pretends to be and a scheme to lay a 
tax upon a non-taxable subject by a deceptive use of words. 
The fact that a tax ostensibly laid upon a taxable subject is 
to be 1neasured by the value of a non"'taxable subject at once 
sng·gests the probability that it was the latter rather than the 
former that the law-makers sought to reach. If inquiry dis-
closes persuasive grounds for the conclusion that such is the 
real purpose and effect of legislation, the tax cannot be up-
held without subverting· the well-established rule that what 
can not be done because of constitutional. restrictions can not 
he arcomplished indirectly by legislation which accomplishes 
the satne result. * * '"'.Constitutional provisio~s,. whether op-
-erating by way of grant or limitation, are t(} be enforced ·ac-
' 
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cording to their letter and spirit and can not be evaded by 
any legislation which, though not in terms, trespassing on the 
letter, yet in· substance and effect destroy the ·grant or limi-
tation.'' 
Further, in the case of Bttrnett vs. Coronet Oil ct Gas Oo~, 
285 lJ. S. 393, Burnett, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
assessed an income tax in respect of income received from 
oil and gas leases of public lands for the benefit of the public 
schools. The Court, after .first holding that such a lease con-
st.ituted an instrumentality of the State Government, then held 
that the income therefrom could no be taxed by the Federal 
Governme-nt, the ·Court tersely saying : 
''To tax the income of the lessee arising therefrom would 
amount to an imposition upon the lease itself." 
In Willcutts vs. Bttn, 282 U. S. 216, Chief Justice Hughes 
said: 
"In the case of obligations of a state or of its political 
sub-divisions the subject held to be exempt from federal taxa:-
tion is the principa.I and interest of the obligations. Citing 
Pollock vs. Fanners Loan·& Trust Oo." · 
In these cases it is recognized beyond question that the tax 
upon the income or intere·st is equivalent to the tax upon the 
subject itself. . 
In a recent case, Fox Film Corporation _vs. Paul H. Doval, 
. 286 U. 8' ..... ; 76 L. Ed. 1010, lVIay 16, 1932, the issue was 
as to the right of the State of Georgia to impose a gross re-
ceipts tax of royalties under a licensed copyrighted motion 
}Jicture. Exemption was claimed on the ground that a copy-
right was an agency of Government. The Court upheld the 
tax on the ground that the mere fact that a copyright is prop-
erty derived from a grant from the United States is insuffi-
cient:to support the claim of exemption, but in the opinion of 
Chief Justice Hughes there was a concession that the tax upon 
the gross receipts under the statute was equivalent to a direct 
tax upon the royalties. .fie said: 
"Appellant insist, and we think rightly, that the operation 
of the statute here in question in its application to gross re-
ceipts is to impose a direct charge upon the royalties. Cit-
ing Northwestern lJtl~tt~ual Life Ins. Co. vs. Wisconsin, 275 U. 
S.' 136; Crewlerick vs. Penna .. , 240 U. S. 292; U. S. Glue Co. 
vs. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 221; N. J. Bell Tele1Jhone Co. vs. 
State B oa'rd, 280 "[J. S. 338. '' 
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II. 
The second contention of the petitioner briefly stated is that 
the Department of Taxation is without authority to make 
any·a·ssessment in 1931 upon income received during the calen-
dar year 1927, or any assessment in 1932 upon the income re-
ceived during· the calendar year 1928. 
The determination of the correctness of this contention de-
pends upon provisions of the Tax Code, Section 418, Section 
23, Section 24, Section 37 and S'ection 38. The Department 
of Taxation claims the right to make the alleged erroneous 
assessment under Section 418 of the Tax Code which pro-
vides in part as follows: 
''If any person, firm or corporation shall have hitherto 
failed or shall hereafter fail for any tax year of the three tax 
uears last past, to make a proper return of his, their or its 
intangible personal property or income, or to have the same 
assessed for taxation, or to pay the proper taxes thereon 
within the time required by law, the Department of Taxation, 
through its examiners of records or other officers or agents, 
shall ascertain the amount of such intangible personal prop-
erty, income or license which shouid have been assessed, and 
shall assess the taxes prescribed by law thereon for the year 
or years so omitted, * $ * . '' (Italics supplied.) 
As we hp,ve seen, the first assessment complained of was 
made on December 29, 1931, on income received during the 
calendar year 1927, while the next assessment complained of 
was made on July 19, 1932, on income received during the 
calendar year 1928. Each of the assessments so made were 
upon income received nof during any tax year of the three 
tax years last past, but made upon income received during the 
fourth year preceding the year in which the assessments were 
respectively made. ~L"he Department of Taxation claims the 
right to assess the income received during the year 1927 as the 
income upon which tax is imposed for 1928, and the incom~ re-
ceived during the year 1928 as the income subject to a tax 
for 1929. Only by this interpret.at~on could either of the as-
sessments here complained of, one December, 193!, and the 
other July, 1932, be considered as ''for any tax year of the 
three tax years last past''. · · 
The issue is narrowed to the question whether the tax levied 
on the income of 1927 is the income tax for 1928 and whether 
the tax levied on the income of 1928 is the income tax for 
1929. The error in which the Department of Taxation has 
fallen is due to the fact that the Department fails to recognize 
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the difference between the Act of 1918 and the Act of 1919 
imposing the incon1e tax, and the Act of 1926 under which the 
income in question in this petition is provided for. 
Under the Act of 1918 and Act of 1.919 an income tax is 
levied in the current year measured by the income received 
in the preceding year. 
While under the Act of 1926 the tax is expressly declared 
to be a tax upon income in the year in which it is received 
though the income is reported and the tax paid in the succeed-
ing year. 
In the income tax law in effect prior to 1926 the income 
tax is declared to be 
'' «< * Q: the aggregate amount of income of each person 
and corpo1·ation residing or doing· business in this State, 
whether received or due but not received within the year next 
preceding the first of ,January in each year, and subject to the 
deductions and exemptions hereinafter recited.'' 
(Section 10, Chapter 219, Acts of 1918.} 
Section 11 of this same ... t\.ct ~poses a tax '' * ~ * on income 
as defined in this schedule". 
Such was the incon1e tax and provision for 1t.s assessment 
I>rior to 1926. Under these provisions the Department of 
Taxation, 'vere they continued in effect, properly claim that 
that the assessment made in one year was the tax for that 
year, though measured by the incorue received in the preced-
ing year. The definition of incon1e and the imposition of the 
tax changed entirely tl1e provisions of the Act of 1918 and 
Act of 1919, the latter being the san1e as the former except 
~s to tlw rate. The incon1e tax effective as to income of 1927 
and the following- years involved in this case is ascertained 
nnd levied in. accordance with the provisions of Chapter 6 
of the present Tax Code of Virginia, the provisions to which 
\Ve will call attention clearly show that tax year and taxable 
year are the same, and that the income assessed for any year 
is the incQme received in that year, thoug·h, as we have said, 
1·eported and paid in the follo,ving year. 
Included in Section 23 "Definitions Generally", is the fol-
lowing: 
''The words 'taxable year' mean the calendar year or the 
flscal year endin~ during· such calendar year upon the basis 
of which the net income is computed under this chapter. The 
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term 'taxable year' includes in the case of a r~turn made for 
a fractional part of a year under the provisions· of this chap-
ter, the period for which such return is made. The ·first tax-
able year, to be called the taxable year ninete~n hundred and 
twenty -seven, shall be the calendar year nineteen hundred and 
twenty-seven or any fiscal year ending during the calendar 
vear nineteen hundred and twentv-seven.'' 
"' Included in this Section providing definitions is the fol-
lowing: 
. ''The word 'resident' applies only to natural persons and 
includes for the purpose of determining liability to the taxes 
impos·ed by this chapter upon the income of any taxable year, 
every person domiciled in this State on the last day of the 
taxable year and every other person who, for more than 
six months of the taxable year, maintained his place of abode 
'vi thin this State, 'vhether dmniciled in this State or not.'' 
The definition of taxable year 'vhich 've have quoted is the 
year as therein stated in 'vhich the income is received. 
In dealing with non-resident, it is the residence during the 
taxable year during- 'vhich the income is received which fixes 
the liability of the non-resident. The tax is reported or as-
~essed in the following year, but it is based upon his resi-
dence in the taxable vear and the income which he received 
jn that year. · 
Section 24 entitled "Definition of gross. income"· further 
emphasizes that the taxable year for income is the year in 
'vhich the income is received, in the following language con-
tained at the end of the first pa.ragTaph of this Section 24: 
''The amount of all such items shall be included in the 
gToss incmne for the taxable year in which received by the 
taxpayer, unless under the methods of accounting permitted 
llerein, such amounts are to be properly accounted for as of 
a different period; * • *." 
The reference to a different period is to take care of hi-
come tax for individuals or corporations having different pe-
riods for their fiscal year. 
Section 37 entitled ''Status of Individuals determined as 
of wha.t time'' also definitely fixes the taxable year or tax 
year for illCOme to be the calendar year in Which the incomo 
has be·en received. This section reads as follows:. 
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"For the purposes of this chapter, the status of all indi-
viduals shall be determined as of the last day of the tax-
able year, except that in the case of an individual who dies dur-
ing the taxable year, the personal exemption shall be deter-
mined by his status at the time of his death, and in such case 
full personal exemption shall be allowed to the surviving 
spouse, if any, according to his or her status at the close of 
the taxable year. The death of an individual during the tax-
able year shall not d~feat the assessment and collection of in-
conle taxes for such period of the taxable year as such indi-
vidual may have had a tax~ble income." 
If there were no other provision settling this question of 
the tax year or taxable year, there could be no doubt in view 
of the express provisions of Section 38 entitled ''Individual 
income tax rates; residents and non-residents'' and which is 
the -express declaration of the levy upon incomes. This Sec-
tion beg·ins with the follo,ving: 
''A tax is hel~eby annually levied for each taxable year 
upon every resident individual of this State upon and with 
respect to his entire net income as herein de:(ined for pur-
poses of taxation." 
On page 20 of the Tax Code this Section 38, after provid-
ing for the rate of the levy, continues as follows: 
''A. like tax is hereby annually levied for each taxable year 
at the rate specified iri this Section upon and 'vith respect to 
the entire net income as herein defined for purposes of taxa-
tion.'' 
The Atlantic and Danville Railroad Co. Case. 
Counsel for the Department of Taxation also refer to the 
case of .Atlantic and Danville Railroad Co. vs. Southern Rail-
~vay Co., 149 Va. 701. This case involved the -construction of 
a lease of property from the Atlantic & Danville Ry. Co. to 
the Southern Railway. The provision in question provided: 
''That in addition to the annual and other rental hereinbe-
fore provided for it (the lessee) will assume and pay taxes, 
levieR, charges ~nd assessments which may be made upon t~e 
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Danville Co. or upon the· demised premises during the term 
hereby created and any and all renewals thereof." 
In a proaching the consideration of the question, the Court 
declared there were certain general principles to be remem-
bered as follows: 
''The deed of lease is to be regarded in the light of the 
following \Veil known rules of construction: (1) The lang'Uage 
of the contract is to be construed most strongly against the 
grantor; and (2) The intention of the parties must be ascer-
tained by reference to the entire instrument and not to ells-
joined parts of it." 
It ~·as claimed on behalf of the lessor that the Federal in-
come tax on the rental paid by the Southern Railway should 
be paid by the latter .. 
One of the points stressed by the Southern Raihvay was 
that the Pollock· Case, having been decided by the Supreme 
Court in 1895, and prior, therefore, to the lease which was 
made in 1899, the income tax could not have been in contem-
plation by the parties. The Court, in referring to the point,. 
said: 
''This is not a conclusive presumption but it is highly per-
suasive.'' 
The· authorities discussed in the majority opinion are all 
cases in which the decision of the Court depended upon the 
aonst1·uction as to the intent of the parties in contracts of 
lease. And while Judge Holt refers to a statement of Black 
in his book on Income and Other Federal Taxes that such a 
tax is not imposed upon the property but upon the proceeds 
~rising therefrom, the opinion of Judge Holt is clearly based 
upon decisions ~dealing· with leases, and reaches a conclusion 
as to the intention of the parties and concludes his opinion 
as follows: 
"We, therefore, are of opinion that an agreement to pay 
taxes and assessments 'which may be made upon the Dan-
ville Company or upon the demised premises' does not cover 
an income tax levied on circumstances such as are shown in 
the case in judg1nent, and that the obligation to pay taxes was 
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not extended by undertakings in any other paragraph of the 
indentur-e lease which have been fully performed.'' 
The dissenting opinions of Judges l\IcLen1ore and Chinn 
took a different view and held that the covenants of the lease 
provided tl1at tl1e incon1e tax should be paid by the Southern 
Railway. 
Judge Holt quotes from Yown.g vs. Illinois Athl. Ass'n, 310 
Ill. 75, as follows: 
" 'It l1as been the universal holding of courts considering 
the question, so far as "re are abl~ to find, that unless the 
leas-e expressly provides for the payment of taxes on the in-
come from rentals received under the lease, the imposition 
of such a burden on the lessee is not justified.' '' 
Ile then refers to a ntunber of ~Iassachusetts cases involv-
ing leases. nnd says: 
''These l\iassachusetts cases, in son1e of which the right to 
impose the tax was upheld, and in some denied, brings out 
clearly the fact that general assumption of obligations to pay 
all taxes is not sufficient. The obligation to pay this particu-
lar tax must be clearly stated." 
It is apparent from a consideration of these cases that the 
issue depended upon a consideration of the terms of the leases 
and a determination therefrom of the intent of the parties, 
and not upon the application of the principle upon which we 
Tely, universally recog11ized, that where the property is ex-
einpt from taxation, the incom·e and revenue derived there-
from can not be ta."{ed. 
Counsel for the Department of Taxation refer to the ease 
of Anderson B1·otlters vs. 1'he Co'11'1/Jnonwealth, 138 Va. 18, in 
support of their contention that the tax imposed on income iH 
imposed in the year following the year in which the income 
has been received. We do not question the correctness of this 
decision, hut call attention to the fact tl1at it involved the con-
stuction of the income tax for the year 1919, which was the 
same as the Act of 1918, except that the rate of tax was in-
cre.ased by the Act of 1919, to both of 1vhich .Acts we have 
heretofore referred. It was because of the express provis-
ions of the la\V then in effect that the Act specifically stateH 
that the ''tax shall be assessed and collected for the year 
1919' '. No taxes could be assessed and collected for this 
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year 1919 under the Act unless they were assessed on income 
received during the preceding year. The statute expressly 
provides, as we have pointed out, for the tax to be upon the 
incon1e "whether received or due, but not received within the 
year next preceding the 1st of January in each year". From 
this provision of the la\v there was a radical departure in the 
incon1e tax law of 1926, as 've have previously shown. 
That the Department of Taxation has impliedly recognized 
the correctness of your petitioner's position can be seen fron1 
a perusal of House Bill N un1ber 205 which, with amendments, 
was passed at the 1934 session of the Legislature. This Bill 
amends certain sections of the Tax C'ode. We are advised, 
and we do not believe that counsel for the Department of 
Taxation can deny, that the Departn1ent of Taxation at least 
aRsistecl in the drafting of this piece of legislation. 
· In order to change the law to conform to the contention 
made in this case as to when the limitation on the time for 
making· assessments expires a paragraph has been added to 
Section 31 of the Tax Code which is as follows : 
''This section, as hereby amended, shall be in force for 
the tax year nineteen hundred and thirty-four upon income 
received or due but not received during the taxable year nine-
t-een hundred and thirty-three and for every taa; and taxable 
,l)ear thereafter until otherwise provided by law." (Italics 
ours.) 
This new paragraph has also been added to Section 36, 41 
and 51. It \Vould appear that it was the intention of this new 
paragTaph adopted by the 1934 Legislature to make the words 
''tax year" and ''taxable year" the same. 
CONCLUSION. 
We submit that the interpretation or construction for which 
·we contend of the constitutional provisions involved, and 
the terrns of the Acts of the General Assembly are clear and 
· unan1biguous ; but, if there· be any doubt, the Court should 
bear in mind the elen1entary principle of construction of 
statutes. This principle is stated by Mr. Justice ~IcReynolds 
for the Supreme Court of the United States as follows: 
''In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes H is the 
·established rule not to extend their provisions, by implica-
tion, beyond the clear import of the language used, or· to en-
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large their operations so as to embrace matters not specifi-
cally pointed out. In case of doubt they are constru{3d most 
strongly against the Goven~1nent and in favor of the citize'lz. 
United States vs. Wigglesworth, 2 Story 369; A1nerican N_et 
& Twine Co. vs. IT'orthington, 141 U. S. 468, 474; Benziger 
vs. United States, 192 U. S. 38, 55."· 
(Gould vs. Gould, 245 U. S. 151.) 
This position has been time and again emphasized in the. 
decisions of this Court, but we may be pardoned for calling 
attention to the brief statements as follows: 
In Commonwealth vs. Lorillard Co~pany (1923), 136 Va. 
258, at pag-e 261: 
''Statutes imposing a tax are most strongly construed in 
favor of the taxpayer." 
In Brown vs. Comtnonwealth (1900), 98 Va. 366, the princi .. 
ple is declared as follows: 
''Laws imposing a license or tax are strictly construed, 
and whenever there is doubt as to the meaning or scope of 
such laws, they are construed mo·re strongly against the gov-
erntnent and in favor of the citizen.'' (Italics supplied.)-
In County of Su,ssex vs. Jan·att (1921), 129· Va. 672 at page 
685, the smue Court, in discussing the power of the legislative 
body to levy a tax on particular classes of property, said: 
'' * * * until that power has been exerted the burden 
cannot be in1posed and the legislative intent to impose the tax 
1nust be explicitly and distinctly shown. It cannot be ea;-
tended by intplication beyond the clear import of the language 
•tsed." (Italics supplied.) 
See also 
Jatnison vs. Com. (1916), 120 Va. 137; 
Elliott's Knob vs. Corp. Com. (1918), 123 Va. 63; •. 
Gotn. vs. Hutzler (1919), 124 Va. 138; 
lntet:state Rd. vs. Roberts (1920), 127 Va. 688; 
Com,. vs. Craddock-Terry Co. (1921), 129 Va. 92. 
24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Th~ Court of Appeals has adhered to and relied upon this 
principle in the opinion handed down at the November term 
of the Court, 1932, in the case of Vi·rginia Raitway &; Power 
Co. vs. The Cottnm.onwealth and the State Corporation Corn-
m·ission, 159 V a. 655. In concluding its opinion, the Court 
dec.lared, page 665 : 
"After a careful study of the statutes involved, we are left 
in serious doubt whether the legislature intended to tax thi::; 
.company on the gross receipts derived from non-public serv-
ice activities. 
" 'Laws imposing a license or tax are strictly construed, 
and whenever there is doubt as to the meaning or scope of 
such laws, they are construed more strongly against the gov-
ernment and in favor of the citizen.' lJrown vs. Common-
wealth, 98 Va. 366, 36 S. E. 485. See also Cou..nty of Sussex 
vs. Jarratt, 129 V a. 672, 106 S. E. 384; C o1W1nonwealth vs. 
Lorillard Cmnpany, 136 ·va. 258, 118 S. E. 323. 
''For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed.' ' 
Your petitioner also asks that he granted the privilege 
of an oral hearing on the granting of the writ above prayed 
for and, if granted, upon a hearing· on the merits, that this 
petition may be treated as his opening brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EPP A. HUNTON, IV, 
Executor of the estate of Eppa Hunton, Jr. 
E. RANDOLPH WILLIAMS, 
EPP A HUNTON, IV, 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
Service of the foregoing petition is hereby accepted this 
31 clay of 1\farch, 1934. 
W. W. ~fARTIN, 
HENRY R. MILLER, JR., 
C'ounsel for Cominonwealth of Virginia. 
We, E. Randolph Williams and Eppa llunton, IV, attorneys 
practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do 
hereby certify that, in our opinion, there is error in the judg-
ment and order entered on the 31st day of January, 1934, iu 
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond in favor of the 
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Commonwealth of Virginia oil a petition for the correction 
of erroneous assessment of taxes filed against it by Eppa 
Hunton, IV, Executor of the Estate of Eppa Hunton, Jr., as 
set forth in the foregoing petition for 'vhich the same sliould 
be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
E. RANDOLPH WILLIAl\iS, 
EPP A HUNTON, IV. 
Received April '6, 1934. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
April 18, 1934. Writ of error and S'Ltpersedeas granted. 
:Hond $2.,000. 
Rec'd Apr. 18, 1934. 
RECORD 
LOUIS S. EPES. 
1\L B. WATTS, Clerk. 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE RECORD. 
Eppa I-Iunton, IV, Executor of Estate of Eppa Hunton, Jr., 
v.s. 
Comnwnwealth of Virginia. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Riclunond., to-wit: 
Pleas at ilie Courthouse of the City of Richmond, before 
:the Hustings Court of the said City, on the. 31st day of 
otT anuary~ 1934. 
Be it remembered, tbat l1eretofore, to-wit: A.t a Hustings 
Court held for the said Oi ty at the Courthouse on the 26th 
day of July, 1932, Eppa Hunton IV. Executor of the Estate 
Qf Eppa Hunton, Jr._, filed a petition for the Correction of 
Erroneous Assessment of Income Tax, whjcl1 Petition is in t~e 
,,vords and figures as follows, to-wit: 
page 2 } Virginia: 
In the Husting·s Court of the City of Richmond, 
July 26, 1932. 
Eppa Hunton, IV) Executor of the Estate of Eppa Hunton, 
Jr"1 
vs. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia. 
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PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ERRONEOUS AS-
SIDSSMENT OE't IN001\1E TAX. 
To the Honorable John L. Ingram, Judge of said Court: 
Your petitioner respectfully presents unto your Honor the 
- following facts: 
( 1) That Eppa Hunton, Jr., a citizen of the State of Vir-
g·inia, residing in the City of Richmond, died on March 5, 
1932. . 
(2) That your petitioner qualified as Executor of the Es-
tate of the said Eppa Hunton, Jr., under his last will and 
testarnent in the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond on 
1\1 arch 10, 1932. 
(3) That your petitioner's decedent was at all times dur-
ing· his life a resident and citizen of the State of Virginia. 
(4) That your petitioner's decedent filed with the proper 
officers of the State of Virginia in the years 1928, 1929 and 
1930, income tax returns of income received during the calen-
dar years 1927_, 1928 and 1929, respectively. 
( 5) That ·your petitioner's decedent did not report as tax-
able income for the calendar year 1927 dividends received 
from the shares of stock owned by him in railroad companies 
which paid au annual franchise tax in the 8tate of Virginia 
under the provisions of Sec. 2R of Chapter 576 of 
page 3 ~ the Acts of Assembly of 1.926, or on dividends re· 
ceived fron1 the shares of stock owned hy him in wa~ 
ter, heat. li~·ht and nower cotnpanies 'vhich paid an auunal 
:franchise tax for said years under the provisions of Section 
36Y2 of Chapter 576 of the Acts of Assembly of 1926, or if your 
petitioner's decedent did report dividends so received, .he de-
ducted the same from his taxable income as reported. 
(6) That your petitioner's decedent did not report as tax-
able income for the calendar years 1928 and 1929, dividends 
rooeived from the shares of stock owned by him in railroad 
companies which paid an annual franchise tax in the State 
of Virginia under the provisions of Sec. 216 of the Tax Code 
of Virginia, or on dividends received from the shares of 
stock owned by him in water, heat, light and power companies 
which paid an annual franchise tax for said years under the 
provisions of Sec. 229 of the Tax Code of Virginia, or if your 
peti.tioner 's decedent did report dividends so received, he 
deducted the same from his taxable income as reported. 
( 7) That during- the calendar year 1927 your petitioner's 
decedent received dividends on stocks owned by him in rail-
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road companies upon which were imposed an annual fran:.. 
chise tax under the provisions of Sec. 28 of Chapter 576 of 
the Acts of Assembly of 1926, and from shares of stock owned 
by him in 'vater, heat, light and power companies upon which 
were imposed an annual franchise tax under the provisions of 
Sec. 36¥2 of the Acts of Assembly of 1926, in the aggregate 
amount of $19,086.00, said dividends being received on shares 
of stock in the companies and in the amounts as follows: 
page 4 ~ R. F. & P. Railroad Co. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Co. 
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. 
Norfolk & Western Ry. 
Southern Railway 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. 
Appalachian Elec. P·o,ver Go. 
Total-









(8) That during the calendar year 1928 your petitioner's 
decedent received dividends on stocks owned by him in rail-
road companies upon which were imposed an annual fran-
chise tax under the provisions of .Sec. 216 "of the Tax Code, 
and from shares of stock owned by him in water, heat, light 
and power companies upon which were imposed an annual 
franchise tax under the provisions of Sec. 229 of the Tax 
Code, in the aggTegate amount of $22,753.00, said dividends 
being received on shares of stock in the companies and in the 
amounts as follows: 
R. ~F. & P. Railroad Co. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Co. 
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Go. 
Norfolk & Western Ry. 
Southern Ry. · 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. 










(9) That during the calendar year 1929 your petitioner's 
decedent received dividends on stocks owned by him in rail-
road companies upon which were imposed an annual fran-
chise tax under the provisions of Sec. 216 of the Tax Code, 
nncl from shares of stock owned by him in watert heat, light 
and power companies upon 'vhich was imposed an annual 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
franchise tax under Sec. 229 of the Tax Code, in the aggre-
gate .amount of $24,527.00, said dividends being received on 
shares of stock in the companies and in the amounts as fol-
lows: 
R. F. & P. Railroad Co. 
Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. 
Atlantic Coast Line 
Norfolk & Western Ry. 
Southern Ry. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co. 









page 5 ~ ~10) That under date of December 29, 1931, in-
come taxes on the amount of such dividends so re-
ceived during the calendar year 1927 were assessed against 
your petitioner's decedent in the amount of $572.58. 
( 11) That under date of ~T uly 19, 19·32, income taxes on 
the amount of such dividends so received during the calendar 
year 1928 \Vere assessed against your petitioner as Executor 
of the said Eppa Hunton, Jr. in the amount of $682.59. 
( 12) . That und;r date of July 19, 1932, income taxes on the 
amount of such dividends so received during the calendar 
year 1929 were assessed against your petitioner as Executor 
of said Eppa Hunton, Jr. in the amount of $735.81. 
(13) That during each of the years 1927, 1928, and 1929 
there 'vas imposed upon each of the railroad companies fran-
chise taxes as provided under Sec. 28 of Chapter 576 of the 
Acts of Assen1bly of 1926 andjpr under Sec. 216 of the Tax 
Code, and upon said water, beat, light and power companies, 
under Sec. 361;2 of Chapter 576 of the Acts of Assembly of 
192~ and/or under Sec. 229 of the Tax Code, and said fran-
chise taxes so imposed were paid by said companies. 
(14) That your petitioner is advised that under the pro-
visions of' Sec. 177 of the Constitution of Virginia, and Sec. 
28 of Chapter 576 of the ... t\.cts of Assembly of 1926 and Sec. 216 
of the Tax· Code of Virginia, the franchise tax on railroads 
therein provided for ''shall be in leiu of all taxes or license 
charges whatsoever upon the franchise of such corporations 
and the shares of stock issued by them,~. 
(15) Your petitioner is further advised that under the pro-
visions of Seetin 170 of the Constitution of Virginia the Gen-
eral Assembly is allowed to levy a franchise tax ''upon other 
property in whole or in part of a transportation, industrial 
or commercial corporation"; that the General Assembly did 
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levy such a franchise tax on water, heat, light and 
page 6 ~ power co1npauies under the provisions of Sec. 361;2 
of the Acts of Assembly of 1926, and Sec. 229 of 
the Tax Code; that it is further provided by 8ec. 170 of 
the Constitution that ''whenever a franchise tax shall be im-
posed upon a corporation doing business in this State or 
whenever all the capital, however invested, of a corporation 
chartered under the laws of the ~State shall be taxed, the 
shares of stock issued by any such corporation shall not be · 
(16) Your petitioner is further advised that under the 




Sec. 229 of the Tax Code.. of Virginia, the franchise tax on 
water, heat, light and power companies therein provided for : If' 
"shall be in lieu of all state taxes or license charges whatso- I 
ever upon. the franchise of such corporations and the shareWI 
of stock issued by it" in accordance with the provisions of 
Sec. 170 of the Constitution. 
(17) Your petitioner is further advised and therefore · 
avers that such an income tax levied on the dividends re-
ceived from the shares of stock owned by his decedent is in 
fact a tax on the shares of stock themselves, and is therefore 
prohibited under the Constitution of Virginia and Sections 
216 and 229 of the Tax Code and Sections 28 and 361;2 of 
Chapter 576 of the Acts of Assembly of 1926. 
(18) Your petitioner further alleges that the tax so as-
sessed on December 29, 1931, on income received during the 
calendar year 1927, was not assessed within ''any tax year of 
the three years last past'', as provided by Sec. 418 of the Tax 
Code, and that such assessment was at the time of its making 
barred by the statute of limitations. · 
(19) That by reason of the foregoing your petitioner is 
entitled to have the aforesaid income tax assessments cor ... 
rected and expunged from the tax records of the State of Vir-
ginia. 
Wherefore, your petitioner prays that the as-
page 7 ~ sessment of the aforesaid income taxes on income 
received by your petitioner's decedent during the 
calendar years 1927, 1928 and 1929, may be corrected and ex- · 
punged from the tax record, and that your petitioner may 
have such further, additional and general relief as the nature 
of his case may require. 
EPP A HUNTON, IV, 
Executor of Eppa Hunton, Jr. 
By E. RANDOLPH WILLIAMS, 
EPP A HUNTON, IV, Counsel. 
30 . Supreme Qourt of Appeals ?f Virginia. 
page 8 ~ An at another day, to-wit: I 
At a Husting·s Court held for the ity of Richmond on 
the 11th rlay of August, 1932. 
Epppa Hunton IV, Executor of the Es ·ate of Eppa Hunton 
Jr., Petitioner, 
vs. 
Commonwe~lth of Virginia, Defendant 
: . · ORDER. 
1 
I 
This day came Eppa Hunton IV, Executor of the Estate of 
Eppa Hunton Jr., by counsel, and presented to the Court 
his petition for the correction of the errbneous assessment of 
an additional income tax on income r eived by Eppa Hun-
ton Jr. during the calendar years 1927 1928 and 1929, and 
it is Ordered that the said petition be a d the same hereby is 
filed, and that the case be docketed. 
page 9 ~ In the Hustings Court of t e City of Richmond, 
Feb. 4, 1933. I 
I 
Eppa Hunton IV, Executor of the Estate of Eppa Hunton 
Jr., Petitioner, I' 
vs. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Defendant!. 
STIPULATION OF F CTS. 
It is hereby stipulated and agreed b and between counsel 
for the respective parites herein as f llows: 
1. That the statements of fact contained in paragraphs 1 
to 13 inclusive of the petition are true; j 
2. That the assessment of tax described in paragraphs 10, 
11 and 12 of the petition were made by the Department of 
.Taxation of the Commonwealth of Virginia pursuant to the 
· provisions of Sections 46 and 418 of e Tax Code of Vir; 
ginia, and bills therefore were sent to the taxpayer and ad-
.vices thereof given to the State Compt oiler on the dates of 
the said assessments, respectively; 
3. That the assessment described in ·paragraph 10 of the 
petition was designated and billed b · the Department of 
Taxation as an assessment for the tax ssessment year 1928, 
the said assessment being based upon tlie dividends described 
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in paragraph 7 of the petition; a copy of the said assessement 
is attached hereto and made a part hereof, marked Exhibit A; 
4. That the assessn1ent described in paragraph 11 of the 
petition was designated and billed by the Department of 
Taxation as an assessment for the tax assessment year 1929, 
the said assessment being· based upon the dividends described 
in paragraph 8 of the petition; a copy of the said assessment 
is attached hereto and made a part hereof, marked Exhibit B; 
5. That the assessment described in parqagraph 12 of the 
petition w·as desig"Ilated and billed by the Depart~ent of Tax-
ation as an assessment for the tax assessment year 1930, 
the said assessment being based upon the dividends described 
in parag-raph 9 of the petition, copy of the said assessment 
is attached hereto and made a part hereof, marked Exhibit C; 
6. That the incon1e of the corporations 'vhich paid the di-
vidends described in paragTaphs 7, 8 and 9 of the petition 
were not assessable with an income tax under the provis-
ions of the Virginia income tax law for any of the years 1926, 
1927, 1928 and 1929; 
7. That both the petitioner and the Commonwealth reserve 
the right to introduce by witnesses such other evidence as 
n1av be material to the issues involved in this case and not 
in conflict with the facts agreed to herein. 
page ·10 ~ E. RANDOLPH WILLIAMS, 
EPP A HUNTON IV. 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
W. W. MARTIN 
HENRY R. MILLE.R, JR., 
Counsel for Commonwealth of Virginia. 
: .~. 
- t_ 
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Form No. 108-D. of T. OOMMONWEAL'l'H OF VIRGINIA 
DEPARTMENT'.OF TAXATION 
EXHIBIT A 
Stamps Cannot Be 
Accepted In Payment 
of Taxes 
NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT OF TAXES ON INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY AND 
INCOMES RESULTING FROM AUDIT FOR THE Richmond, Dec. 29, 1 1931 
TAX ASSESSMENT YEAR OF 1928 
Payment ot Taxes:-These taus must be po!d direct to tho Treaaurer ot Virginia at Richmond w!thln60 daya from tho dato ot this notice. 
Penalties tor tailure to pay theJO Taxes by duo dnto:-11 these Taxes be not paid on or-betore due date, "the law bupoeea a penalty ot 5% on the amount of Taxet 
and Penalties asse6sed, plus au addltlolllll amount for Interest at tho rate of 1% per month or fmction of a month from tho date of tbia notice. (Section 4e 
and 84 of the Tax Code of VlrgilliA.) 
Eppa Hunton Jr. 
810 W. Franklin St. 
Richmond, Vlzgini& 
Page and LineN o. 
401 ind·l 






Income -- _19,ml6_ --
MAKE CHECKS OR MONEY ORDEBS PAYABLE TO THE ORDER OF THE 
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Form No. 108-D. of T. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION 
EXHIBIT B 
Stamps Cannot Be 
Aceept.Cd in Payment 
of Taxes NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT OF TAXES ON INTANGmLE PERSONAL PROPERTY AND 
INOOMFJJ RESULTING FROM AUDIT FOR THE Richmond, Jul19, 1932 
TAX ASSESSMENT YEAR OF 19211 
Payment of Taxes:-Thesc taxes must be paid di:ect to tho Treasurer of Y!rgiDia at Richmond within 60 da)'ll from the date oC thb notice. 
PenAlties for failure to pay theec Taxes by duo date:--If theec Taxes be notcpald on or before due date, the law imposes a pcualty of 5% on the amount of Taxes 
and Penaltica ~1 plus an additional amount for interest at" the rate of 1% per month or fraction of a month from the date of this notice. (Sectlon 46 and 84 of the Tax Ulall of Virginia.) • 
Eppa Hunton Jr. Deceased 
Eppa Hunton IV. 
1003 Electrio Building, 
Richmond, VIrginia 
Page and Linll No. 
331 ind-2 
Subjoot of Taxation 
~~~ 
Penalties Interest · 
Assessed ABsessed 
Income - 682.59 
MAKE CHECKS OR MONEY: ORDERS PAYABLE TO THE ORDER OF THE 
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Fonu No. 108-D. of T. COMMONWEALTll: OF VIRGINIA 
·DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION 
EXHIBITC 
Stnmps Caunot Be 
Accepted in Payment 
of Taxes NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT OFT~ ON INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY AND 
INCOMES RESULTING FROM AUDIT FOR THE Richmond, Jul. 19, 1932 
TAX ASSESSMENT YEAR OF 1930 
Payment of Tues:-Tbese tues mua be p:Ud direct to Ule Treasurer of VirginiA at Richmond within 60 da)'ll from the dAto of &his notice. 
Penalties for failure to JIGl these Tues by due date:-If these Tues be not paid on or before duo date, the law im~ a pena!ty of 5% on the amount of Tues 
~ Penalties ~~ plWI a.n addltiolllll amount for illtcren at tho rate of 1% per month or frectlon of a month from tho date of this notice. (Section 46 
...... 84 of tho Tu U)Qe of Virginia.) .• 
Eppa Hunton Jr. Deceased 
Eppa Bunton IV. 
1003 Electric Build!D& 
Richmond, Va. -~ 
Subject of Tuatlon Values Tues Assessed Penalties Interest Aasessed Aasesaed 
241 iDd-1 Inecmo - -~--- -~._527 __ 736.81 
MAKE CHECKS OR MONEY ORDERS PAYABLE TO THE ORDER OF TBE 
TREASURER OF VIRGINIA AND SEND THIS NOTICE WITH REMITTANCE 




F~ppa Hunton, IV, Executor, etc., v. Common~ealth. 37 
page 11 } And at another Hustings Court, to-wit: 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond on the 31st 
day of January, ~934. 
Eppa Hunton IV, Executor of the Estate of Eppa Hunton 
Jr. . 
vs. 
The Commonlvealth of Virginia. · 
PETITION ~FOR COR.RECTION OF ERRONEOUS AS-
SESSMENT OF INCOME TA....X. ORDER. 
This day came the Petitioner by his Attorney and also the 
Defendant by its .Attorney, and by agreement of Counsel this 
.application can1e on to be heard upon the petition :filed herein, 
the Stipulation of ·Facts entered into by the parties, which 
stipulation is a.1nde a part of the record herein, the oral ar-
gument of Cotmsel and the briefs :filed herein, whereupon 
upon consideration of all of which the Court is of opinion that 
the Petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for in his 
petition and it is ordered by the Court that the application 
of the Petitioner for relief against the income tax assess-
ments involved in these proceedings be and the same is hereby 
denied and the petition disn1issed, and that the Defendant re-
cover of ti1e Petitioner its costs wbout its defense in this be-
half expended. 
To lvhich order of the Court, Petitioner~ by Counsel, ex-
cepted and prayed that his exception be noted of rooord, which 
is accordingly done. . . 
page 12} Estate of Eppa Hunton Jr. vs. Connnonwealth of 
Virginia 
W. M. J\Iartin3 Esq.; 
Counsel Department of Taxation, 
January 31, 1934 
R·~chmond Virginia. 
Dear Mr. J\{artin, 
This is to advise you of my intentio11 to apply to the Hust-
ings Court of tile City of Richmond at 9· :30 A. J\II. on -Febru· 
ary 14th, for a transcript of the record in the above case for 
the purpose of applying to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia for a writ of error therein. 
38 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
\Vill you kindly accept service of this notice on. the copy 
of this letter enclosed herewith. 
Very truly yours, 
·Legal and timely service of the within notice accepted this 
2nd day of February, 1934. 
W. W. MARTIN, 
Counsel for Defendant. 
Cost of this transcript $5.00. 
page 13 ~ State of Virginia, 
. City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, Walter Christian, Clerk of the flu stings Court of the 
City of Richmond.; do hereby certify that notice of applica-
tion for a transcript of the record in this case was duly given 
by Eppa Hunton IV and E. Randolph Williams, Counsel for 
Petitioner, to \V. W. ~Iartin, Counsel for Department of Tax-
ation of Commonwealth of Virginia. 
Given under my haucl this 24th day of February, 1934. 
WALTER CHRISTI.A.N1 
Clerk of I-Iustings Court of City of Richmond .. 
I, Walter Christian, Clerk of the Hustings Court of the 
City of Richmond, do hereby certify that the foregoing in a 
true and accurate transcript of the, record in the case of Eppa 
Hunton IV, Executot· of the Estate of Eppa· Hunton Jr, vs. 
Comn1onwealth of Virginia. 
Given under my hand this the 24th day of February, 1934. 
WALTER CHRISTIAN, 
Clerk of Hustings Court of City of Richmond .. 
A Copy-Teste: 
1\L B. WATTS, C. C. 
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